Reputation of Chinese anti-satellite and cyberwarfare to offset U.S. conventional superiority
Date:2012-01-16Author:adminCategory:China militaryComment:0
Data for: People’s Liberation Army battle command system screenshots.
U.S. “national interest” magazine website on January 12 article, the original question: US-China relations after terror the next decade, East Asia has once again become a major focus of the United States. But Time has changed the world, China is now second only to the U.S. economic, technological and military power. China’s rise to the interests of U.S. regional allies and new challenges, an increase of U.S. strategic risk. China’s emphasis on deterrence and nuclear policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, but it also can suppress the deployment of U.S. missile defense and the second generation of nuclear weapons against the United States. Even more worrisome is that China is building the satellite and computer network attack tools, and America’s prosperity and security depend on the satellite and computer networks. Although the United States is very powerful, but more and more vulnerable to strategic attack.
China faces a similar paradox of strength, that strength enhancement associated with increased vulnerability, it is because in nuclear, space and network three strategic areas of technology rather than more likely to enhance the strategic offensive strategic defense capability . Since both countries are increasingly dependent on space and network transmission of data, which increases the satellite network attacks and the potential hazards. If the Chinese people think that the more powerful the more indestructible, that they are mistaken.
technology has greatly reduced the cost of strategic attack. Compared with strategic bombing, paralysis key satellite and computer network without a shot being fired, the price is low. However, space or network attacks can hit the United States or China’s economy.
have resources to maintain a strong US-China strategic nuclear weapons and to build anti-satellite and cyberwarfare capabilities. They also have the motivation of each other. However, arms control with the defense as the United States can not make out each other’s strategic vulnerability. Asymmetric nuclear capability and the United States, so the two nuclear disarmament is unrealistic. Control of anti-satellite weapons can not be verified. Network of arms control is unheard of.
reduce the United States and the rising vulnerability of each other, will depend on a different approach: mutual strategic restraint, that the two countries should reach a consensus, not the first to use nuclear weapons, anti-satellite weapon or a network of the other party or its allies in the implementation of strategic attack. For the United States, this means accepting China’s nuclear deterrent. The United States should adhere to commitments made to China, do not take the initiative to attack vital to our economic or strategic satellite network.
can keep its promise, even in times of crisis, ultimately depends on mutual deterrence. Neither the U.S. nor China, understand it if one can not resist revenge, then it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, anti-satellite weapons, or network. Of course, the devil in the details, but to each other how to define the key strategic restraint.
for the United States, the United States now make the strategic restraint is a good time. China may be reluctant, especially considering the Chinese army’s anti-satellite and cyberwarfare is the way to offset U.S. conventional superiority. However, the U.S. can come up with strategies designed to reduce the risk of a comprehensive program consistently implemented. ▲ (The author is David Philip ? ? Gang Pote and Sanders, Analysis Wang translated)
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