Many U.S. experts say China is difficult to detect the missile deployment, including Lu Meijun
Data for: PLA Second Artillery Corps fixed within the range strategic missile silo launch data for: the implementation of long-range ballistic missiles, the PLA Second Artillery Tactical
U.S. Naval War College professor James ? Holmes 16 in Japan, “diplomat” magazine (the-diplomat) Web site wrote that despite the Pentagon released an annual report on Chinese military power, the PLA clearly outline map of the missile’s range, but it ignores the PLA increase the missile range, mobility enhancement features. The article said that the PLA now many missiles and their launchers would be deployed in the inland areas, even if the technology is very powerful U.S. military can not fully detect and lock, which gives significant operational advantages of the PLA, is not enough to deter U.S. military dare to act rashly in the Taiwan Strait conflict.
The article said that former U.S. Institute in Taiwan Chairman Richard Bush ? Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania Journal “Orbis” published an article assessing the cross-strait situation. He said in the text “dysfunctional politics” is not conducive to the island’s efforts to respond to urgent challenges, but cautiously optimistic for the future of Taiwan made a conclusion. At the same time, Bush also deployed short-range ballistic missiles that China has faced restrictions. He pointed out that the Pentagon’s annual report on Chinese military power is very good evidence. China’s military power in last year’s report, the report authors did not improve their Chinese mainland missiles deployed against Taiwan’s assessment. In 2009 and 2010 reports, they believe that this figure should be between 1050-1150. (Taipei, spokesman for the higher number given, they believe that mainland China’s missile deployment against Taiwan, the island about 1300.)
Richard ? Bush pointed out that the PLA fielded an increasing number of cruise missiles. For example, in 2009-2010, an increase of about 100 cruise missiles, and this total does not include them in the number of short-range ballistic missiles. Bush also pointed out that “China’s Taiwan Affairs to stop interfering in the ability of the United States is rapidly increasing,” which means that the Beijing government for its strategic position relative to the future more and more satisfied with the enemy. However, the Second Artillery missile forces continue to enhance its ability to improve the accuracy of its missiles and deadly. In short, although the People’s Liberation Army to deploy new short-range ballistic missiles has slowed down, but continues to enhance its operational capabilities. In other words, the number of weapons can not reflect much of a force’s combat strength.
In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense report on Chinese military power usually include a clear outline of the People’s Liberation Army missile range map. Color-coded bar chart shows the front-line deployment of Chinese missiles can reach the area near the Chinese border. Of width equal to the established missile range, this method is very suitable for depicting the Second Artillery Corps, such as a new CSS-5 anti-ship ballistic missile (often referred to as DF-21D) or ground ballistic missiles and other capabilities. Map showing the deployment of anti-ship ballistic missiles along the border can cross the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait to combat beyond the first island chain outside the Indian Ocean region. In fact, the entire Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, parts of the northern part of China now has anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) ring being threatened.
but the article pointed out that the Pentagon create a range map to a certain extent misleading, may mask subtle operational and strategic reality. Pentagon that China’s missile range map are located around the edge of the area around the fixed location. In fact, these missiles may still be deployed in the inland areas, while maintaining its ability to attack important targets, both Taiwan and U.S. bases in Japan or the high seas. If the Chinese commanders to meet in the waters near Taiwan’s deterrence ship, so they inland a few hundred meters through the anti-ship missile launchers will be able to do this. Or through the above two methods can be. As the mobile ballistic missile is mobile and, therefore, the Second Artillery forces can be relatively easily re-deployment of missiles. This means that increasingly flexible capabilities, the PLA can be used against Taiwan, far more than the short-range ballistic missile numbers. With China’s continuous improvement of weapons hardware engineers to expand the missile’s range and hitting power, the PLA will become more flexible.
part of the missile forces deployed in the interior, the PLA commanders can benefit a lot. Concealment is one significant advantage. In the vast territory of detection and positioning mobile launchers in the United States military has never been completely resolved, a challenge – the 1991 Gulf War, in western Iraq, “Scud hunting” operation failed, during the 1999 Kosovo war, Serbian troops on the ground almost no was a big trauma, which are the United States in this area witnessed the negative. China and varied terrain to improve the survivability of the troops. In addition, through extensive use of the strategic depth of China, People’s Liberation Army commander in the battle with the enemy can be an advantage. For the United States, to send aircraft to take action on the interior of China, and even ordered the U.S. Navy warship fired cruise missiles against the hinterland of China, which hit the coastal location is totally different
Indeed, Beijing may deter the enemy attack inland targets – the risk of conflict escalation may be limited to full-scale war at sea, the cost of this war the enemy is far more than expected limited political objectives. PLA may use this simple expedient to prevent external intervention. It appears that Richard ? Bush may have underestimated the temper of Taiwan and China’s missile threat to the country of friends. In addition, many scholars believe that the strategy of the United States and Asia, Bush used the wrong standard to measure the threat of China’s Taiwan Island. With the Second Artillery missile forces the expansion of the range, the Taiwan People’s Liberation Army commander may withdraw some or all of the other side of short-range ballistic missile force, but will not reduce too much capacity to fight. Beijing’s move might make people believe that a peaceful Taiwan Strait, but also to retain a military option (for Taiwan independence elements). Of Beijing, this is a win-win solution. (Spring)