Military of China, force comment.
Military of China, force comment.

in the Falklands the April 1, British veterans held a procession to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Falklands war.

author] Ye Hailin (writer of this comment)

“International Herald Tribune article on April 5, 30 years ago, the British Royal Navy task force set sail from London waters, after two and a half of the sail 10 003 1 000 km away from the Malvinas Islands, the British 258 killed (including three on the island of civilians), six ships were sunk, 34 aircraft were shot down or crashed the cost of $ 1.7 billion cost of the war Argentina and Hong Kong’s name changed back to Port Stanley.

Sheffield General Belgrano sinking of the British excellence in ultra long-range mobility and supply ability has always been the focus of talk about the war, whereas for the war why the outbreak, but less cause for concern. From the British point of view, the war is entirely because of the Argentine military government passed on to the domestic economic crisis plan; Argentine admits the active choice of the A side – General Galtieri last was overthrown and brought to court, not because he launched the war, but because he lost the war.

Although English is the winner of the Falklands war, but, outside of the Falklands war, in addition to the big country Britain has a rusty image of polishing temporarily sparkling, has not brought to London any important strategic interests, the United Kingdom and then also have to spend an increasingly high cost of maintenance of the Falklands military presence. Obviously, to avoid war and continue to occupy the Falklands is Britain’s real interests lie, for that matter, from the perspective of strategic game, and that Britain’s responsibility for the war is not able to deter military action in Argentina, is a typical failure of deterrence leading to the outbreak of the war.

So, why Britain’s deterrent strategy did not produce their effects? In other words, what makes Argentine concluded that Britain will default to the Afghan army tore down the Union Jack of Port Stanley over not to take counter-action?

history does have many similarities. Rather, the Falklands war in 1982 should be called the second Malvinas Islands War, as early as 1833, Britain had sent the Imperial Navy warships once recovered from the hands of the newly independent 10 years of Argentine Falklands . Two British action, because the Argentine first took occupation of the Falklands by force, the only difference is that the previous busy processing after the Napoleonic era in European affairs Britain waited 13 years, and then the first Englishman to make war decisions only one day.

history of another similar in that two Argentine military action in fact established in the UK will not adopt the strategy of force to counter the judgment on the basis of the Argentine first did not bet on it. In the final analysis, this miscarriage of justice is the most fundamental reason for lead Argentina into the Falklands disaster. As Galtieri general recognition: “I conclude that it is almost impossible or completely not some thing, in any case, I by no means unsuspecting Britain will go to war”.

consider that today there are still many countries, the existence of maritime sovereignty disputes with each other, and in many countries on the marine interests of the proposition is in fact the other party will not resort to force as a precondition. This strategic judgment in the South China Sea, especially popular, and therefore to review the Argentine strategic misjudgment of the British factor in the reason for the big country to prevent regional maritime disputes evolution is essential for the local war.

the first outbreak of the Falklands war, the United Kingdom Prior to want to fight and Napoleonic France to the bitter end, long ago to withdraw from the Falklands garrison in order to save money. Second Falklands war the previous year, the UK cut the defense budget reasons, decided to withdraw armed forces from the Falklands. Two evacuation plans from the perspective of the United Kingdom, not England want to give up the Falklands only to determine the Falklands is neither a defense priorities did not face imminent risk of war. This, of course, is also a strategic misjudgment – the British apparently underestimated the desire of the Argentine on the Falklands. But this miscarriage of justice, the consequences are not serious, because the United Kingdom have sufficient naval power to correct their mistakes.

Argentines error is much more serious, they understand the burdens behavior of this technology acts do not intend to defense of the Falklands this strategy will therefore dare to take the case of military strength is not a horizontal line adventurist policy. England A two direct game side, the two sides of the misjudgment of the true origins of the war. Can neither party foresaw heavy smoke over the Port Stanley, the British had to fight back – for reasons of the Conservative government ruling position, and the Empire majesty; Argentine did not expect – and did not think the British will be determined to The war for the territory of the empire more than 10 thousand km away.

pulled the line of sight to the South China Sea and China, the distance is much closer, and what lessons to draw from the Falklands war, China? After all, the use of force to resolve maritime disputes is clearly not the best option for China. In addition to military technology, the strategic level may include the following lessons.

success of deterrence must be hardware and software both have sufficient maritime strength, should have firm rights will, and must continue to be perceived by the will to pass out, or else can make the weak strength of the other party or parties to the dream.

Second, a conflict may exist geographical friendship is extremely necessary. This is not the British Falklands lessons, but lessons learned after the Falklands. Britain in the Falklands issue was the exclusion of all South American countries, making the Falklands military remained extremely expensive. The progress of the war, the British terrestrial resupply point distance of the theater of thousands of kilometers away, which is obviously greatly improve the operational costs. Maritime disputes, to obtain the sympathy and support of some other countries in the same region in the strategy is crucial, whether the use of force is to maintain deterrence or deterrence is not valid.

again, not the rational conduct of international relations body have too much confidence. International events is not always the calm calculation of results, to give full consideration to the possibility of other actors, greed, short-sighted, psychological imbalance. And at any time should keep in mind related to the territorial dispute, either party do not think their position is wrong someone else’s idea is reasonable, reasoning usually need to be force to convince to support and supplement.