U.S. military reports that the mainland’s Taiwan operations may use the blitzkrieg war blockade
The article said the two sides go to war if PLA special forces infiltrated into Taiwan will attack
LONDON, March 30 News: 25 U.S. Department of Defense released the” 2009 China Military Power Report, “China Defense Ministry spokesman Hu Changming that the report ignores the objective facts of China proper, the normal defense construction unwarranted charges, rendering the so-called Taiwan the mainland, “military threat.” China expresses strong dissatisfaction and resolute opposition.
United States, “Chinese Military Power Report,” Taiwan-related part of the following, these fully reflect the U.S. interference in China’s internal affairs and obstruct the reunification of criminal intent.
Chapter PLA modernization and the Taiwan Strait security
security situation in the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese mainland, Taiwan and the United States between the three largest concerns and interaction issues. The PLA has developed and deployed a force sufficient to Taiwan region, or in the case of the use of force necessary means of military capabilities. PLA to improve the security of Taiwan has brought new challenges, due to the lack of projection capabilities, the PLA can not be 100 sea miles wide across the Taiwan Strait, which is Taiwan’s “Island defense” to bring the natural geographical advantages, In addition, Taiwan’s technical superiority and the United States to take the possibility of military intervention in Taiwan’s security situation are the main constituent elements.
Although since Ma Ying-jeou elected Taiwan leaders, Beijing has been released publicly on the situation in the Taiwan Strait positive message, but there is no indication that the mainland’s military deployment against Taiwan has undergone major changes. China’s President Hu Jintao called for confidence-building mechanism across the Taiwan Strait, the PLA remains to be seen how to act.
Taiwan war in order to establish their own reserves, has taken some important measures, but also improve their joint operations, crisis response. By and large, the face of Beijing’s military buildup continued, these improvements have strengthened Taiwan’s natural defensive advantages. Taiwan also focus on “building an all-volunteer, professional military force”, while reducing the size of their military forces – from 27.5 million to 20 million cut, or may be cut to 18 million people, and maintain the current level of defense budget (GDP 3%). Under this plan, a smaller armed forces consume costs will decline, and these soldiers will be a corresponding increase in wages and benefits.
Taiwan Strait, the U.S. government has opposed any unilateral change of both the Taiwan Strait status quo, and called by the public on both sides are in a manner acceptable to the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan Strait issue. Accordance with the “US-Taiwan Relations Act” (1979), the United States by providing weapons and support for Taiwan’s defense self-defense, to help the Taiwan Straits to maintain peace, security and stability. In addition, after the U.S. global force redeployment of the armed forces and the reform of the United States Department of Defense is maintained in the region has some of the military, the use of force to prevent Beijing to resolve the Taiwan issue.
Beijing’s Taiwan strategy
Beijing seems ready to push back the use of force means, I believe cross-strait relations as long as Beijing continues to trend toward a unified direction, And the costs of armed conflict is greater than the potential benefits. In the next short period of time, Beijing’s goals may be focused on “Prevention of Taiwan through a set of political, economic, cultural, legal, diplomatic and military facilities to force the power of the strategy to move toward de jure independence.” Although Beijing expressed its willingness through “to allow Taiwan to achieve a high degree of autonomy” peaceful means to achieve reunification across the Taiwan Strait, but the PLA to deploy short-range ballistic missiles, enhanced amphibious capability and advanced long-range air defense system has been covered by modern Taiwan Strait region, has shown that Beijing is still reluctant to abandon the use of military means.
in history, China has repeatedly warned that the use of military means, the development over time, this may be because Taiwan announced their political status, PLA capabilities and Beijing on Taiwan relations with other countries view the impact of factors such as the outbreak. These conditions or “red lines” include:
Taiwan formally declared independence;
vaguely toward independence;
internal turmoil situation in Taiwan;
Taiwan to acquire nuclear weapons;
indefinite postponement of resumption of reunification across the Taiwan Strait dialogue;
foreign forces interfere in Taiwan’s internal affairs;
foreign troops stationed in Taiwan
In addition, in March 2005 adopted the “Anti-Secession Law,” Article VIII, ’cause if the separatist forces in Taiwan split from China in fact; If events leading to Taiwan from a Chinese; or the possibility of peaceful reunification has been slim, “then Beijing can use non-peaceful means. These “red line” fuzzy meaning, Beijing has strengthened the credibility of deterrence and allows Beijing to determine its response capability to the nature, timing and form.
Beijing’s Taiwan operations program
PLA’s ability to expand the scheme even more careful with Taiwan’s military action. Some analysts believe that Beijing will be the first to adopt a conventional approach, characterized by an open show that you are ready to take the use of force, followed by a premeditated build-up of combat forces, to accelerate the speed of the implementation of strategic deception. Other analysts argued that when the situation is more likely to occur in other international may respond before the Beijing ready to give up time to take a sudden military action and/or political actions to resolve the Taiwan issue. If a quick resolution is not implemented, Beijing will seek to:
curb possible U.S. military intervention;
if containment failed, then possible to delay U.S. intervention, action and in an asymmetric, limited, quick war to win;
war to a suspended phase, and in a protracted conflict for political solution.
isolation or sea blockade
While traditional isolation or sea blockade of Taiwan will have greater impact, but also the PLA Navy ability burden. Articles in some of China’s military had expressed a potential alternative solutions – air blockade, missile attacks and mine warfare, the purpose is to block ports and channels. Beijing may announce a vessel is heading to Taiwan in the mainland port calls, so you can port these vessels before they arrive in Taiwan to inspect. Beijing may also be trying to hold exercises or missile tests announced, closing some major waters leading to the island of Taiwan, so as to achieve the same effect with the blockade. As early as 1995 and 1996 missile tests and live-fire exercises, the PLA used this method. However, this action there are some risks, because any limit maritime traffic to and from the island of Taiwan are the actions related to international pressure will lead to military confrontation and escalation, Beijing may underestimate this effect.
use of limited military force, or force them to surrender
in a limited war with Taiwan, Beijing may use a variety of destructive, punitive or lethal military action is likely to combine some of the overt and covert economic and political activities. Such a war may include: computer network attacks against Taiwan and the political, military and economic infrastructure, limited movement attack, induced fear of Taiwan’s people in Taiwan and undermine the leadership of Taiwan’s confidence. Similarly, the People’s Liberation Army special forces have penetrated into the Taiwan region, may have the infrastructure or to attack the leaders of the Taiwan region.
air and missile warfare
of Taiwan’s limited short-range ballistic missile air defense system attacks and precision strikes against targets will include, air bases, radar stations, missile, space and communications facilities, equipment, these military actions against Taiwan’s defense could weaken the ability to paralyze Taiwan’s military and political leadership, and people in Taiwan are likely to smash into the military against the determination.
some of China’s publicly published books or articles for amphibious landing operations have been described in different concepts. One of the most prominent is the joint landing islands, imagine a concept of logistical support, air support, naval support and electronic warfare are equally dependent, very complex military operations. The goal will be surrounded by a breakthrough or shore-based defenses in Taiwan, the island’s west coast north or south of a beach, transportation to the designated landing site operations personnel and material, and then attacked and occupied the key to control the target, or even the whole Taiwan Island.
present, the PLA’s ability to complete a variety of amphibious operations, but can not be implemented throughout the island of Taiwan landing operations. In addition to daily training, the few obvious military preparations, so the PLA has the potential to islands currently controlled by Taiwan to launch and landing operations. Landing operations in the practical realization of this territory back, while also will show the PLA’s military capabilities and to show the political determination, but also allow the opponent to find some way to stop. However, if such operations are not blocked, then it would have significant political risks, military actions because this may stimulate the people of Taiwan and to stimulate international opposition voices. If a medium-sized PLA, shore-based defense of the island have started landing operations, such as Kinmen or Matsu, then it’s entirely within the scope of the PLA.
large-scale amphibious landing is an extremely complex and very difficult military operations. The victory entirely on air, sea or ashore quickly establish and maintain a continuous supply of transport and support top. Efforts to recover Taiwan by force, will allow for decades never had a real test of war the PLA nervous, and will lead to international intervention. These pressures, combined with the PLA’s combat power consumption, the complexity of urban warfare and counter-sabotage operations (assuming a successful landing and break through Taiwan’s Liberation Army defense), so that “on the island of Taiwan amphibious landing operations” in the political and military all at risk great risk. Taiwan weapons to strengthen the defense capabilities of hardware and investment in Beijing will be a corresponding decrease in the ability to accomplish its goals.